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Abstract 
 This paper looks at the major cross-pressures facing Representatives, and how 
these can affect their behavior when voting on environmental legislation. This was done 
by conducting a roll call analysis of the American Clean Energy and Security Act, using a 
multi-variate logit regression analysis of eight independent variables. Results showed that 
the non-renewable energy production of one’s district can dampen the effect of party-line 
voting behavior, in addition to the significant effect of public ideology and a 
Representative’s own environmental preferences. However, this lessening of party 
influence was seen more commonly in Democrats than Republicans, and production 
levels of renewable energy proved to be insignificant in affecting voting behavior. These 
findings reveal the importance of non-ideological self interests in voting behavior, show 
an optimistic level of policy responsiveness, and highlight the unique challenge of 
passing legislation to combat climate change.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	   3	  
 On any given roll call vote, a member of the House of Representatives is facing 
pressures from a wide variety of sources. Her constituency, fellow party members, and 
personal ideology can influence her final decision to vote “yes” or “no”. Occasionally, 
there are cases where these influences are in tension with one another, leading the cross-
pressured Representative to decide which influence presents the most political weight. 
 When voting on environmental legislation, there are many cases when these 
cross-pressures become stronger. In regards to legislation on renewable energy, a 
Representative from Idaho will be torn between the state’s high production of renewable 
electricity and their strong conservative tradition, just as a Representative from Rhode 
Island will face friction between the state’s large use of fossil fuels and strong liberal 
tradition, which usually takes the pro-environmental stance.   
 In 2009, during the 111th Congress, a bill called the American Clean Energy and 
Security Act (ACESA) was introduced to the House. It was called a “landmark bill” by 
the League of Conservation Voters, as it was the first time Congress attempted to make a 
comprehensive effort to curb climate change. Main provisions of the bill included a 
requirement to have 20% of electricity production come from renewable sources by 2020, 
higher targets for reducing emissions of carbon dioxide from carbon dioxide and other 
greenhouse gases, and a cap-and-trade system to be used to limit greenhouse gasses. It 
was passed by a vote of 219-212, the first time either chamber of Congress had 
successfully passed a bill attempting to curb climate change, even though it went on to be 
defeated in the Senate. When voting on the bill in the House, 44 Democrats and 8 
Republicans did not vote their party line.  
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 A roll call analysis on this bill can lead to better understanding of a pressing and 
important issue. Problems from pollution and climate change threaten food production, 
national security, citizen’s health, and in the long-term and direr predictions, apocalyptic 
disasters. Unlike bills before it, ACESA was unique due to its extensive plan to address 
these pressing issues, and by better understanding the voting on this bill, we can ensure 
bills of a similar nature can be passed in the future. Congress has the power to move the 
nation towards a more sustainable model, and for the good of everyone it is important to 
comprehend their thinking process when voting on far-reaching environmental measures, 
such as ACESA.  
 It is also the case that this bill was voted on in a highly partisan climate, and 
therefore, those who did not vote with their party must have had a strong reason for doing 
so. This speaks to a broader question of when and under what circumstances one voting 
influence can overpower another.  In determining what caused these Representatives to 
defect, there is a possibility of locating an influence that will only grow in importance if 
we move away from a highly polarized system. 
I. Literature Review   
 In determining the influences on Representatives voting on environmental 
legislation, there is a large body of work to build from.  Broad categories, such as 
constituency, party identification and ideology, have been proven to influence 
Representatives to varying degrees and in varying situations. However, when one focuses 
these influences on one issue--environmental legislation--it is still unclear when these 
influences become dominant or nonexistent for members of the House of 
Representatives. 
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 Roll call votes are when member’s choices are most visible and accessible, and 
when they are the most potentially vulnerable, as various levels of support can be 
withdrawn if those supporters do not agree with the member’s vote (Blass, Hickey & 
Theriault 2011).  While voting is typically not a perfect reflection of a member’s stance 
on an issue—committees filter which bills will be voted on, rules and procedures 
determine the allowance of amendments and if the vote is on or off the record—many 
outside influences have various levels of effects on the member’s vote, and therefore 
perceived preference.  
 This visibility is even more pronounced when it comes to environmental policy, 
as Congress has taken the clear lead in shaping the policies of this issue, through passing 
laws and creating statues, certain committees’ jurisdictions over EPA issues, as well as a 
large presence of congressional oversight. This leads to a problems of “too many cooks in 
the kitchen,” leaving the process for passing environmental policy fragmented (Fiorino 
1995). It therefore becomes important to more clearly determine the main influences 
involved in voting on environmental legislation, to clear already inherently muddy 
waters.  
Constituency influences  
 Today, there is a general consensus that a legislator’s top priority is re-election 
(Mayhew, 1974).  Therefore, frequent elections, especially for those in the House, ensure 
that members of Congress consider the opinions and preferences of their constituents 
(Blass, Hickey & Theriault 2011).  
Public Opinion  
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 A Representative’s vote could therefore be influenced by public opinion, or by 
one’s perception of public opinion. Miller and Stokes (1963) found that correlations 
between constituency opinion and Representative roll call behavior varied according to 
issue. They found that Civil Rights was highly correlated, while Foreign Affairs issues 
had little to none. They further discovered that Representative’s tend to overestimate their 
visibility to the public, and most of the time the general population knows little about a 
member’s stances on issues (Miller and Stokes 1963). 
 Kingdon (1973) built on this, by interviewing Representatives after they cast 
certain roll call votes and found that even though they felt the public was not paying 
attention, they still didn’t want to cast a vote that could be used against them in the next 
election. Arnold (1990) expanded this theory by conceiving of the “potential preferences” 
of a constituency, and proposed that Representatives used “political intuition” to adjust 
their roll call votes to what they believe will be the safest choice. In this conception, even 
“inattentive publics”—those who have neither firm policy preferences about an issue or 
knowledge of what Congress is considering—still have an informal impact on 
Representative behavior (1990, 65).  Therefore, even when the environment was 
considered a “hard” issue—too complex for people to divide into ideological or partisan 
categories—Representatives still would have considered constituency opinions 
(Kamieniecki 1995, 147). Now that the issue plays a bigger role in public awareness and 
political importance, the consideration of public opinion on environmental matters should 
be greater.  
 However, others believe the extent of this impact is never quite so clear. When 
Achen (1978) re-ran Miller and Stokes data through more specific types of 
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representation—what he called proximity, centrism, and responsiveness—he found that 
the correlation between public opinion on Civil Rights and roll call votes was overstated, 
and more generally, that there was less cohesion between Representative behavior and 
their public’s opinions than previously thought.  
 Nevertheless, there is a general assumption that policies to protect and improve 
“public welfare,” such as the environment, are dependent upon a supportive public to be 
successful (Dunlap 1989). It has also been found that the majority of the public, when 
asked about purely environmental issues—not when forced to choose between the 
environment, and say, energy security—the pro-environment position is consistently in 
the majority.  Even when the questionnaires ask the public to perform a trade-off, usually 
between the environment and the economy, the majority public opinion will still usually 
be in favor of environmental protection (Dunlap 1989).  
Seat Security  
 The winning margins of a Representative’s seat can also be a factor in roll call 
voting. Kraft (1989) believes that it is possible to associate electoral security with a 
Representative’s spending time on environmental issues when it is unattractive to their 
constituency.  Bartels (1991), however, found that even members in “safe” seats are still 
influenced by their constituents, as even Representatives elected from the narrowest 
possible margin would be less than 5% more responsive than a Representative without 
opposition.  
Economic Interests 
 The economic interests of a constituency, such as the number of fossil fuel-
burning power plants the town employs or the production of renewable energy, can also 
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influence a roll call vote. Bartels (1991) found direct evidence of this in his study of 
constituency opinion and an increase in the Reagan defense appropriations bill. He found 
that district level economic benefits or burdens were correlated to the amount of spending 
decreases or increases proposed by the Representative.  
 It is common to use a similar concept of costs and benefits when analyzing 
environmental policy. Costs can be the direct costs of compliance to regulation, such as a 
lost production capacity in an industry, or social costs, which are valued goods and 
services that are removed when resources are diverted to environmental ends. Benefits 
are seen as the favorable effects associated with a decision, or costs avoided, such as lack 
of health problems from high emissions or the aesthetic value of a clean sky (Fiorino 
1995, 118). Hussain and Laband (2004) ran an experiment analyzing roll call votes on 
environmental legislation in the Senate and found both the presence of Representative 
considerations of these costs and benefits and a possible explanation for why certain 
Representatives, particularly northern Democrats with large fossil fuel industries, could 
defect from the party stance. Their findings affirmed Maloney’s (1984) earlier 
hypothesis, which is that votes on environmental legislation are dependent on the cost 
implications for each state. 
 Stigler (1971) expands on this further, claiming that Representative behavior is 
best explained by economic self-interest. When a Representative faces pressures from the 
general public and a more specialized sector, such as the producers, he claims that the 
producers are usually more “persuasive,” and therefore have a larger effect on voting 
behavior. By this reasoning, the interests of the renewable or non-renewable energy 
	   9	  
production companies in the district could be the larger constituency influence than the 
public’s ideology.  
Party influences  
 While the scope of constituency influence may be inconsistent, the influence of a 
Representative’s political party is fairly straightforward. In their book Congress and Its 
Members, Davidson and Oleszek (2006) highlight how party affiliation is the strongest 
single correlate of member’s voting decisions, especially in recent years. The percentage 
of times a member of the parties has voted with the party majority has gone up from 
around 65% in 1974 to around 95% in 2004. They also mention the “incredible shrinking 
middle” of the past years, where formerly substantial centrist groups, like Conservative 
Democrats and moderate to liberal Republicans, now make up less than 10% of the 
parties (290). New member socialization through party organization and leaders 
rewarding loyalty with committee seats and campaign support leads to this polarization, 
although there are certain issues that have been shown to override party ideologies—such 
as farm subsidies, public lands management and immigration.  
 There are two main schools of thought for describing party influence. The first, 
coined by Cox and McCubbins (1993), explain this behavior with “procedural cartel 
theory.” This theory that claims political parties are organized like cartels, and therefore 
benefit from cohesion, which is why they keep divisive issues off the agenda and reward 
loyalty to the party platform. The second, developed by Aldrich and Rohde (2000), is 
called “conditional party government,” and claims that the amount of power a party 
leader has is a condition of the ideological similarities among the party members.  
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 Focusing on the environment, Dunlap and Allen (1976) found strong partisan 
correlations between Democrats and pro-environment voting--especially in the north--and 
Republicans and anti-environment voting, usually due to a pro-business orientation and 
aversion to government intervention, creating the most likely explanation of voting 
behavior for those that didn’t defect from their party. Calvert (1989) claims this strong 
political identification is not surprising, as “partisan conflict is often trigged by 
governmental intervention in the economy” and “environmental degradation is often the 
end product of private economic activity,” (159). This is in contradiction to earlier 
research by Ogden (1971), who believed natural resource management was a “consensus 
issue” and therefore nonpartisan. His theory, however, is not supported by the roll call 
behavior.  
 Others believe because voters have been sorted ideologically and geographically 
that it has created a new system, where countervailing party and constituency concerns 
rarely exist (Blass, Hickey & Theriault 2011). Even so, this will not take into account 
countervailing capabilities of one’s geography, via access to non-renewable resources, 
and either party or constituency concerns.   
Ideological influences 
Personal Ideology 
 Ideology is here defined as a Representative’s personal preferences on issues. 
Determining a Representative’s personal ideology is tricky, as they “defy both direct 
observation and simple operationalization,” (Blass, Hickey & Theriault 2011).  
 Poole and Rosenthal (2007) argue that most roll call votes are split along a 
continuum of liberalism and conservatism, and that because of this, most issues are 
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clearly divided by ideology. They further find that the presence of this continuum has 
been very stable since the Civil War, and that Representatives are similarly stable on the 
continuum, and largely, “die with their ideological boots on,” (2007, 7).  
 However, ideology is not often at the center of considerations due to the high 
correlation between ideology and party affiliation. Nokken (2000) diminished this by 
showing that when a Representative switched parties, they had to modify their roll call 
behavior in the face of new party pressures.  
 In his study of environmental roll call votes in the Senate, Jon Nelson (2002) 
found that Senators’ voting behavior was most explained by their ideology, which creates 
the possibility that more moderate members of each party could defect for this reason.   
Environmentalism  
 Besides a Representative’s leanings toward liberalism or conservatism, their 
personal level of environmentalism can also influence their votes, in this case defined as 
“environmental preferences.” Kau and Rubin (1993) found that a Representative’s score 
on an ideological voting index, such as an LCV scorecard, was significant in determining 
their roll call votes.  
 Through these studies, the various general influences acting on Representatives as 
they cast a roll call vote have been well established. What is not clear, however, is when 
they influence a Representative, or when one influence might become more important or 
dominate the others. The environment has potential to create influences that are in great 
tension with one another. One hand, this issue has significant impact on the constituency, 
both by being a salient issue and also having an impact on the local economy, creating 
pressure for the Representative to vote for their constituency’s interests. On the other 
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hand, the issue is not immune to the polarization in Congress, and also has the ability to 
affect a Representative’s conscience, as a cleaner environment promotes good for all 
mankind. Determining the strength of each influence, especially the ones that caused the 
defectors in a highly partisan climate, can lead to a better understanding the hierarchy of 
roll call influences on an important issue and a landmark bill. 
II. Methodology  
 The hypotheses this study is designed to test are as follows: 
H0: None of the independent variables influence the roll call vote. 
H1: Party Identification influences the roll call vote. 
H2: Constituency Interests influence the roll call vote. 
H3: Environmental preferences influence the roll call vote.  
 The statistical analysis used in this study is multi-variate logistic regression 
analysis due to the dichotomous dependent variable--the “yes” or “no” vote on ACESA. 
Party Identification 
 A Representative was given a “1” if they identified as a Democrat, and a “0” if 
they identified as a Republican. Party identity was sourced from The Washington Post’s 
U.S. Congress Votes Database. 
Constituency Interests 
 The independent variables related to constituency interests are the constituency’s 
ideology, the MWh, or annual megawatt-hours of electricity produced, of energy 
generated in 2009 by both renewable and fossil fuel sources, and a control variable of 
previously existing state infrastructure related to renewable energy production. This was 
taken from Carbon Monitoring for Action (CARMA). This variable was chosen to reflect 
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the scope of energy production in each district, as well as its emissions of CO2. Nuclear 
energy was not included in these calculations, due it be being considered neither a 
“renewable” or “non-renewable” source, but rather its own category. CARMA, which is a 
product of The Center for Global Development and the Confronting Climate Change 
Initiative, determined these production values by using data reported to the 
Environmental Protection Agency and Department of Energy by the plant operators of 
power plant and power companies (Carbon Monitoring for Action). 
 Public ideology was sourced from the American Ideology Project, complied by 
Tausanovitch and Warshaw (2013), who created an “MRP” score, where high values 
were associated with conservatism and low values with liberalism. An index was created 
to reflect the previously existing state infrastructure. One point was given to a state for 
implementing each of the following: mandatory renewable portfolio standards, public 
benefit funds for renewables, mandatory green pricing for electricity suppliers, financial 
incentives for carbon capture, emission targets, climate action plans and energy 
efficiency resource standards. This information was taken from the Center for Climate 
and Energy Solutions.  
Environmental Preferences 
 The independent variables related to a Representative’s ideology are their 
environmental preferences and personal level of conservatism, with a control variable for 
seat security. Personal ideological scores were taken from the “DW-Nominate Scores” 
complied from Poole et al. (2009) for the 111th Congress. Seat security was expressed in 
the winning margins for each Representative from the 2008 Congressional elections. 
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 The Representative’s environmental preferences were determined by the 
“scorecard” given to each member by the League of Conservation of Voters. In the 111th 
Congress, there were 13 votes on environmental issues. The vote on ACESA was counted 
twice due to its groundbreaking content, and was therefore removed from the calculation 
used here to prevent over determination of the variable. Therefore, the score was 
calculated by each Representative receiving a “1” for voting the pro-environmental 
position, the totals of which were divided by 12, the total number of votes this session not 
including ACESA.  
III. Results 
Summary of Logistic Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting “Yes” Votes on 
ACESA (n=431)  
 
Log likelihood= -81.880 
 
Predictor      coeff   SE   P>⎥z⎥ 
Democrat      .693   .756   .360 
Pre-Existing State Incentives     .343   .119   .004 
Non-renewable Energy Production  -6.27e-8             2.39e-8  .009 
Renewable Energy Production    5.00e-8  4.18e-8  .232 
Public Conservatism    -5.02   1.25   .000 
Environmental Preferences    .074   .015   .000 
Seat Security       .004   .011   .731  
Constant      -7.18                           1.39   .000 
Figure 1 
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 The results show confirmations of Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3, as while party 
identification explains much of the voting behavior, under certain circumstances, 
constituent and ideological concerns caused the Representative to defect from the party 
stance.  
 The level of the constituency conservatism and a Representative’s environmental 
preferences tied in receiving the lowest p score, showing both were a statistically 
significant factor in the voting behavior.  
 Constituency conservatism receiving this score is not so surprising in light of 
Nelson’s findings that Senators were most influenced by their personal ideology when 
voting on environmental legislation, and as members of the House are up for election 
more often, it logically follows that they would be influenced more so by their public’s 
opinion instead of their own (2001). This also shows that the environment is an issue 
where constituency opinion and a Representative’s voting behavior are highly correlated, 
similar to the relationship Miller and Stokes found on the Civil Rights issue. The 
relationship was also in the expected direction, as the higher the public’s level of 
conservatism, the less likely it became for a Representative to vote “yes” on ACESA.  
 The Representative’s environmental preference received the same, statistically 
significant, p score as well and was also in the expected direction. The larger a 
Representative’s environmental preferences, or tendency to align themselves with the 
pro-environment vote, the more likely she was to vote “yes.” It was also found that many 
Democrats, eleven in total, who received perfect scores from the scorecard, still did not 
vote “yes” on ACESA, suggesting another variable is needed to explain their behavior. 
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The control variable of pre-existing state infrastructure was also found to be statistically 
significant.   
 A second model was run in which the scorecard from LCV that was used to create 
the “environmental preferences” variable was replaced by a DW Nominate score to create 
a “representative ideology” variable, which can be found in the Appendix. In this 
alternate model, personal ideology was statistically significant and in the expected 
direction: the more personally conservative a Representative is, the less likely she is to 
vote “yes” on ACESA. The model with the “environmental preferences” variable (Figure 
1) was chosen because it was .233 percent more predictive and had a .18 percent larger 
reduction in error score.  
 In replacing the variable “personal ideology,” with the more predictive variable 
“environmental preferences,” party identification was no longer statistically significant.  
This is mostly likely explained by the high correlation between party, public ideology and 
environmental preferences.  
 Party Environmental 
Preferences 
Nonrenewable 
Energy 
Public Ideology 
Party 
 
1.00    
Environmental 
Preferences 
.917 1.00   
Nonrenewable 
Energy 
-.121 -.146 1.00  
Public Ideology 
 
-.535 -.600 .344 1.00 
Figure 2 
 As Figure 2 shows, the least correlated relationship is the one between party and 
non-renewable energy production, a relationship best explained by the presence of both 
Democratic states with high levels of non-renewable energy and also Republican states 
with high levels of renewable energy. Interestingly, the production level of nonrenewable 
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energy in each district was significantly, negatively correlated to voting “yes,” but the 
production level of renewable energy was not. This shows that Representatives are more 
concerned with the negative economic effects on their district than the positive effects, or 
lack of negative effects. This also confirms Arnold’s (1990) theories concerning 
Representatives and their fear of casting a vote that could be used against them, as they 
were more strongly influenced by the production sector that would be hurt by the bill 
than the sector that would be helped. Nonrenewable energy is also a larger and older 
industry, and thus affects more jobs and has more resources available to it to potentially 
influence a Representative. 
 Figure 3 shows the relationship between nonrenewable energy production, party 
identification, and the probability of voting “yes” on the bill. It seems like the influence 
of party is reduced when the non-renewable energy production variable is entered, 
dampening the effect of being Democrat. Thus, it appears that as Democratic districts 
produce larger levels of non-renewable energy, the more likely their Representative 
becomes to defect from the party stance and vote “no.” Similarly, the effect of low non-
renewable energy production seems to dampen the effect of being Republican. 
Representatives in Republican districts that produce large levels of non-renewable energy 
are virtually guaranteed to vote “no,” and those with a higher probability of voting yes 
have little to no non-renewable energy production. This shows the ability of a specific 
constituency influence, in this case, non-renewable energy production, to override the 
influence of party identification on voting behavior.  
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Figure 3 
 The appearance of Figure 3 also suggests an interaction might be taking place 
between party and non-renewable energy production. However, after running the 
interaction, the new variable (party*nonrenewable) was not statistically significant, 
suggesting that the simpler model works.  
 Further, the high p score from “environmental preferences” suggests a possible 
intervening relationship, with “environmental preferences” being the intervening variable 
between a possible unknown and the vote on ACESA. After running a multivariate 
regression with “environmental preferences” as the dependent variable, the independent 
variables nonrenewable energy production and the public’s level of conservatism proved 
statistically significant. This indicates the possibility that both a Representative’s 
nonrenewable energy production levels and constituency opinion affect her 
environmental preferences, which, in turn, affect her voting behavior on environmental 
legislation. 
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Summary of Multivariate Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting “Environmental 
Preferences (n=431)1 
 
R-squared: .364 
 
Predictor      Coef.   SE  T  P>T 
Pre-Existing State Incentives  .442  1.00  .44  .659 
Nonrenewable Energy Production 3.04e-7 1.98  1.72  .087 
Renewable Energy Production 1.68e-7 3.40  -.490  .622 
Public Level of Conservatism  -88.4  6.534  -13.5  .000 
Constant    55.86  4.33  12.88  .000 
 
Figure 4 
  
 The model used from this analysis correctly predicts Representative votes on 
environmental legislation 91.2% of the time. This rate gives the model an 82.1% 
reduction in error score. It has also identified important ideological and constituency 
influences that were able to overcome the influence of party identification in an 
extremely partisan environment, influences that will only increase in importance as the 
political climate becomes less polarized.  
IV. Discussion  
 In doing this narrow study of the American Clean Energy and Security Act, the 
factors that are influential in determining votes on environmental legislation were 
brought to light, revealing the challenges in passing widespread reform to combat the 
pressing threat of climate change. While is it common knowledge that the current highly 
partisan climate in Congress makes passing any kind of legislation difficult, the narrow 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  * Democrat was removed as a variable due to multi-co-linearity  	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margin by which the bill was passed, even with a large Democratic majority in the 
House, suggests simple party affiliation cannot completely explain Representative 
behavior. Party’s ability to constrain voting behavior is weakened when non-renewable 
energy production is introduced.  
 For those concerned with the widening of party divisions and its controlling effect 
on Representatives, this is good news. Even with strong polarization, certain constituency 
interests --in this case, the energy industry in one’s district—can override party interest, 
making the Representative more accountable to their public. In attempting to predict a 
vote in the House, it seems prudent to control for non-ideological self-interests, as these 
have been shown to dampen the control of one’s party. These findings give hope for 
those concerned with strong partisan ties lessening a Representative’s responsiveness to 
her constituents, as when a Representative’s district will be harmed economically, they 
have been shown to vote against their party.  
 For those concerned with curbing climate change, however, this is bad news. 
Even when the House was stacked in favor of the pro-environment position, the bill was 
only narrowly passed and went on to die in the Senate, perhaps because as they are up for 
election less frequently, Senators are less responsive to the influences of constituency 
interests.  
 The statistical significance of non-renewable energy production, and the lack of 
statistical significance of renewable energy production, can be used to partly explain the 
thinking of Representatives. In the modern American Congress, it seems Representatives 
are more concerned with the “sticks” of bills instead of the “carrots.” Members who had 
district industries that would have been hurt by the bill’s passage were more influenced 
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by this fact in their voting behavior, than members who had district industries that would 
have been helped. In our current climate, it seems the negative effects of a bill are more 
persuasive than the positive effects.   
 Findings also present a conundrum: in order for a Representative to vote “yes” on 
a bill curbing non-renewable energy production, they must already have low non-
renewable energy production. This presents a unique problem that will be difficult to 
overcome in order to battle climate change and promote cleaner energy. In passing 
environmental legislation, environmental practices will need to already be in place to 
ensure that the bill will pass.  
 This could also be used to pass the burden onto state legislation. According to 
findings, structures within each state can have significant impacts on the voting behavior 
of the Representative. If individual states become more active in passing state-level 
incentives to promote cleaner energy, it makes their respective Representative more 
likely to pass wider, national legislation. A burden can also be placed on media and 
lobbying, as the consistently high significance of the public’s level of conservatism 
shows that the importance the public places on the environment can be influential in 
passing environmental legislation.  
 These crosscutting pressures that are capable of lessening strict party lines can be 
applied to other policy areas. The economic implications of immigration reform would be 
an interesting and important area for future research.  
 In summation, the cross-pressures of party and the economic interests of one’s 
district were shown to be a significant factors in passing the ground-breaking American 
Clean Energy and Security Act, and will most likely be significant in passing other areas 
	   22	  
of reform. Findings from this narrow roll call analysis showed the challenges in passing 
climate change reform, but also showed that even extreme levels of partisanship can be 
dampened by the self-interests of a Representative’s district. However bleak the current 
political climate may seem, this analysis shows that Representatives—whatever their true 
motives-- do still take the welfare of their constituency into account when casting roll call 
votes.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
V. Appendix  
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A. Summary of Logistic Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting “Yes” Votes on 
ACESA (n=431) with “Representative Conservatism” replacing “Environmental 
Preferences” 
 
Log likelihood= -93.89 
 
Predictor      coeff   SE   P>⎥z⎥ 
Democrat     1.81                        1.09                   .096 
Non-Renewable Energy Production             -5.43e-8           2.42e-8                .025 
Renewable Energy Production                       -1.62e-8                     3.22e-8                .615 
Public Conservatism    -5.34                          1.23                     .000 
Representative Conservatism   -3.02                          1.22                      .013 
Pre-existing State Incentives     .287                       .113           .011 
Seat Security     -.006                       .016                      .732 
Constant                                                          -1.53                          1.48      .301 
 
B. Measurements  
Variable Description Minimum Maximum Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Democrat The political party to which 
a Representative belongs.  
A Representative received a 
“1” if she was a Democrat 
and a “0” if she was a 
Republican. Information 
sourced from The 
Washington Post’s U.S. 
Congress Votes Database.  
0 1 .59 .49 
Environmental 
Preferences  
A Representative’s tendency 
to vote “yes” on bills that 
are considered “pro-
environment.” Taken from 
twelve roll call votes that 
concerned the environment 
during the first session of 
the 111th Congress. For each 
bill, a Representative was 
given a “1” if she voted 
“pro-environment,” and “0” 
if she voted against.  The 
0 100 61.95 41.58 
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scores from each bill were 
then added together and an 
average score was found.  
Non-renewable 
Energy 
Production 
The MWh of energy 
produced by fossil fuels in 
the congressional district in 
2009. Information sourced 
from Carbon Monitoring for 
Action (CARMA), which 
relied on information 
reported to the 
Environmental Protection 
Agency and Department of 
Energy by the power plant 
operators themselves to 
create their database.  
0 56,000,000 5,992,137 8,730,000 
Pre-existing 
State 
Incentives  
An index was created using 
information from the Center 
for Climate and Energy 
Solution’s Publication 
“State Action.” Each state 
received “1” point for 
implementing each of the 
following measures 
encouraging reduction in 
greenhouse gases and 
supporting renewable 
energy: mandatory 
renewable portfolio 
standards, public benefit 
funds for renewable energy, 
mandatory green pricing for 
electricity suppliers, 
financial incentives for 
carbon capture, emission 
targets, climate action plans 
and energy efficiency 
resource standards. The 
points were then added 
together. 
0 7 3.76 1.80 
Public 
Conservatism  
The public level of 
conservatism was found on 
the American Ideology 
Project’s website, the scores 
of which were complied by 
Chris Tausanovitch and 
Christopher Warshaw. They 
used an original survey that 
allowed them to jointly 
scale the policy 
preferences of respondents 
to seven recent, large-scale 
national surveys using an 
item- response theory 
(IRT) model, as well as 
-1.08 .49 -.029 .289 
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pooling from other 
datasets. To find the 
estimates of the districts, 
they generated estimates of 
mean policy preferences 
using both simple 
disaggregation and 
multilevel regression with 
poststratification (MRP).  
Renewable 
Energy 
Production 
The MWh of energy 
produced by renewable 
sources in the congressional 
district in 2009. Information 
sourced from Carbon 
Monitoring for Action 
(CARMA), which relied on 
information reported to the 
Environmental Protection 
Agency and Department of 
Energy by the power plant 
operators themselves to 
create their database. 
0 77,000,000 1,185,495 4,7778,65 
Representative 
Conservatism 
Scores were taken from 
research done by Carroll, 
Lewis, Lo, Poole, and 
Rosenthal to create a 
measurement called DW-
NOMINATE Ideal Point 
Estimates via Parametric 
Bootstrap. Using the roll 
call votes of Congress 
members, they rated them 
on a scale of -1 (very 
liberal) to 1 (very 
conservative).  
-.731 1.226 .068 .517 
Seat Security Seat Security scores were 
coded as the percentage of 
the vote the Representative 
received in the 2008 
Congressional elections. 
There percentages were 
found on the Election 
Results page of The New 
York Times, posted on 
December 9th, 2008.  
44.8 100 69.10 31.61 
 
C. Marginal Effects  
  
Independent Variable Marginal Effect 
Democrat .593 
Infrastructure 3.76 
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Nonrenewable Energy Production 6.0 x 10^6 
Renewable Energy Production 1.2 x 10^6 
Public Conservatism -.028 
Environmental Preferences 62.0 
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